NINO
B. COCCHIARELLA took to be the correlates of concepts, both NF and ML can be given a very natural motivation, especially when modified to include urelements. In what follows we shall defend this motivation by examining the structural similarities in question. , but whereas for Ramsey classes were real and had their being in the objects which belonged to them, Russell chose not to assume that classes had any being at all but rather that all our talk of classes was to be explained in terms of concepts. Quine, of course, eschews all intensional entities and saw in the theory of simple types only a theory of sets in the sense of classes which are composed of their members. (For Quine, apparently, the axiom of extensionality provides a full account of the being of a class.) The real ontological import of the theory of simple types, according to Quine, is a stratified comprehension principle for sets which it trivially effects through its overly restrictive grammatical constraints. If we delete these grammatical constraints as being improperly retained through their historical connection with the intensional theory of ramified types, then what remains is none other than the stratified comprehension principle for sets given in NF. Quine also assumed, but only as a "harmless" simplifying gesture, that the axiom of extensionality was to be applied to all objects whatsoever. It follows of course that there is then but one urelement, viz., the empty set. Objects which are not sets, according to Quine, can be simply identified with their singletons, though of course no commitment need actually be made in NF that there are any such objects at all. Stated as an applied first order theory (with identity), the system NF is really quite elegant in its simplicity.
